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Abstract
We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and
their intrinsic motivation. When workers are motivated, ine¢ ciencies due to adverse selection are
mitigated and a change in salaries may have unexpected consequences. With a su¢ ciently strong and
positive association between motivation and productivity, a wage increase may attract less motivated
and also less productive workers. When the association is positive but small, it instead may attract
more productive and also more motivated workers. Our theoretical analysis reconciles contrasting
empirical evidence on vocational sectors such as for public servants, teachers, health professionals and
politicians. Our results also inform the current policy debate on whether it is possible to improve the
overall quality of workers by changing their salary.
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1 Introduction
The problem of the selection of the best possible applicants to a job opening has received considerable
attention in the labor economics literature. It is usually acknowledged that higher wages are necessary to
attract applicants with higher skills or ability.1 We show that this is not always true, when a vocational
labor market is considered in which workers are heterogeneous in both their ability and their motivation
for the task to be performed.
Our paper theoretically investigates the (self-)selection of applicants into a sector where both skills
and workersintrinsic motivation are private information to the workers. We show that changes in the
composition of the pool of applicants due to changes in the o¤ered wage rate dramatically depend on the
distribution of ability and motivation in the population of potential workers. In particular, we will nd
that, because of the interplay between ability and motivation in the workersparticipation constraint,
it is possible that higher wages attract workers characterized by lower ability and lower motivation on
average. A Lemons problemwith bidimensional adverse selection thus arises.
When rms in a competitive market o¤er a job to workers who have private information on their pro-
ductivity only, it is well known that ine¢ ciencies arise (the "standard" Lemons problem). In particular,
e¢ ciency would require the rms to o¤er a di¤erent wage to workers characterized by di¤erent produc-
tivity levels. However, because of asymmetric information, rms o¤er a uniform wage to all the workers.
When the workersoutside option is contingent on workersability, workersdecisions on accepting the
job or not depend on their productivity level in a way that adversely a¤ects the rms: outside the market
the payo¤ is larger for more productive workers, thus only relatively less capable workers are willing to
accept the job at any given uniform wage o¤ered by rms. This leads to an ine¢ ciently low employment
rate, to a low average productivity of active workers and, what is more important to us, the average
productivity of active workers is monotonically increasing in the wage rate.
Consider now a vocational market such that each worker also privately knows how much he/she is
motivated for the job o¤ered by rms. How does this second source of workersprivate information a¤ect
the Lemons Problem? How is labor supply characterized in this vocational market? In particular, do
higher salaries still attract more productive workers?
Intrinsic motivation is interpreted as a benet accruing to workersutility when employed in a voca-
tional sector, unrelated to workerse¤ort or output (see also Heyes 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2010 and
Dal Bò et al. 2013). A vocational labor market is thus a sector where motivated workers receive a
vocational premium, whereas a standard labor marketis a sector o¤ering no vocational premium.
We rst analyze the natural framework of adverse selection in markets in which: (i) the opportunity
cost of accepting the job in the vocational-market is increasing in workers productivity; and (ii) for
1 In what follows, we will use the terms skills, ability and productivity interchangeably.
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informational or institutional reasons rms in the vocational sector can only o¤er a uniform wage, i.e.
a salary that is independent of productivity and vocation. However, our model is general enough to
also accommodate and describe di¤erent situations, for example where the wage rate rewards workers
productivity, i.e. rms in the vocational sector use incentive schemes.2
We compare the ine¢ ciency caused by adverse selection in the Vocational Lemons Model with that
in the Standard Lemons Model in which intrinsic motivation is irrelevant and does not a¤ect workers
participation constraint. We show that a vocational market attracts high vocation workers characterized,
also, by high productivity. Thus, intrinsic motivation mitigates the production ine¢ ciency due to adverse
selection.
We obtain a rich set of results concerning how average productivity and average vocation of active
workers change with the wage rate and, as we discuss below, we are able to reconcile contrasting empirical
evidence on the di¤erent vocational sectors. Intuitively, as the wage increases, more skilled workers
become interested in the job; on the other hand, less motivated candidates apply for the job when there
is a negative statistical association between productivity and vocation or when the two characteristics
are independently distributed. This intuitive case indeed shows that, in order to attract more highly
skilled applicants, higher wages may be necessary; but this comes at the cost of attracting less motivated
workers (see, among others, also Delfgaauw and Dur 2010 and Dal Bò et al. 2013). However, we show that
two counter-intuitiveand mutually exclusive cases can also emerge in the case of a positive statistical
association between productivity and vocation.
If the wage rate increases, then: either (i) the average productivity of active workers can actually
fall; or (ii) the average vocation can instead rise. A su¢ cient condition for result (i) concerning average
productivity is the existence of at least a level of salary such that active workers have average productivity
above the average of the entire population. Similarly, the condition for result (ii) on average motivation
is the existence of at least a level of salary such that active workers have an average motivation below
the average of the entire population.
To account for the mechanism driving the counter-intuitive results suppose that, for a given wage rate,
a pool of workers enters the market having average productivity above the population average. Then,
an increase in salary necessarily brings into the sector workers with below-average productivity, implying
that the average productivity of active workers decreases for at least a subinterval of possible wage levels.
Conversely, consider now a pool of workers with average vocation lower than the population. Then, an
increase in salary brings into the market workers with above-average vocation, implying that the average
vocation of active workers is going to increase.
Importantly, the su¢ cient condition for each one of the two counter-intuitive e¤ects is consistent
2The alternative interpretations will be discussed in the paper, together with conditions such that results of the baseline
model still hold.
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with a positive statistical association between productivity and vocation in the population of potential
workers. This means that the two e¤ects cannot coexist and that an increase in the wage either can make
both average productivity and vocation of active workers jointly increase, or jointly decrease. In the rst
case, we observe that the pool of active workers improves with respect to both workerscharacteristics,3
whereas in the second case we observe that the pool deteriorates.
Note that, in our model, workersmotivation has no direct impact on rms output. However, it
indirectly a¤ects the sectors production by means of the self-selection mechanism of workers into the
vocational market; such selection pattern, in turn, is driven by the joint distribution function of skills and
motivation in the population of potential workers. In the end, the magnitude of the positive association
between the two characteristics determines which counter-intuitive e¤ect arises. Indeed, when the associ-
ation between skills and motivation is strong, then motivation has a relatively higher impact on workers
participation constraint than ability. This in turn implies that average motivation of active workers
decreases with the salary. However, because of the positive association between motivation and ability,
average ability might decrease as well for a non-empty set of possible wage levels. So that, together with
the fall in motivation, we may observe a fall in production. The opposite phenomenon occurs when the
association between skills and motivation is still positive but weak. In this case, ability has a relatively
higher impact on workersparticipation constraint than motivation so that, as expected, average produc-
tivity of active workers increases with the salary. However, because of the positive association between
the two characteristics, higher average ability goes hand by hand with higher average motivation. Then,
an increase in the wage rate ultimately causes an increase in both production and motivation.
How to attract better applicants has been investigated, both theoretically and empirically, in specic
vocational markets, such as the market for teachers4 , the market for nurses5 , for civil servants6 and for
politicians7 .
Some theoretical contributions focus on workersmotivation only (see Handy and Katz 1998, Francois
2000, Heyes 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, Prendergast 2007). They point out that motivated workers
are characterized by lower reservation wages so that, by increasing the o¤ered salary, rms also attract
workers that are less motivated for the job and, as a result, the average level of motivation in the pool
of active workers decreases. The e¤ect of asymmetric information with respect to both productivity and
3This is precisely the case analyzed in Dal Bò et al. (2013) that will be discussed in more detail in what follows.
4Among others Figlio and Stone (1997), Figlio and Lucas (2000), Figlio (1997), Nickell and Quintini (2002), Dolton and
Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011).
5For example Heyes (2005) and Barigozzi and Turati (2012).
6Francois (2000), (2007), Prendergast (2007), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), (2010), Macchiavello
(2008) and Dal Bò et al. (2013).
7Besley (2004), (2005), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Keane and Merlo (2010), Mattozzi and
Merlo (2008), Ferraz and Finam (2011), Fisman et al. (2012).
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motivation has been analyzed by Dal Bò et al. (2013) in a theoretical model developed to guide their
empirical inquiry. The authors restrict the distribution of the two characteristics in the population of
potential workers by only considering two extreme cases: either ability and motivation are assumed to
be independently distributed among the population or a positive and perfect correlation between the two
variables exists (in practice, the workerstype space becomes unidimensional). They nd conditions such
that higher wages increase average motivation in the applicant pool. However, their model predicts that
higher wages always increase average skills in the applicant pool, so that it is not able to explain some
of the existing empirical evidence that we are going to discuss below.
The empirical evidence on the e¤ect of a wage rate increase on the quality of the active work-force is
controversial. Several papers focus on workersskills, and document that higher wages increase applicants
skills, measured by di¤erent proxies.8 Important exceptions are Merlo et al. (2009) and Fisman et
al. (2012) who nd the opposite pattern in the case of politicians. The empirical question concerning
motivation is more di¢ cult to assess. Dal Bò et al. (2013) analyze how skills and intrinsic motivation
of public servants are a¤ected by a wage increase. Interestingly, the eld experiment that they analyze
shows that higher salaries attract workers who are more skilled and have a higher proclivity toward public
sector.
Our model o¤ers a theory of how the distribution of ability and motivation in the population of
potential workers determines the impacts of a wage change on the composition of the work-force in
vocational sectors. Despite its extreme simplicity, our model is su¢ ciently general to characterize in a
unied framework di¤erent possible outcomes and to reconcile the contrasting evidence identied so far
in the empirical literature, as we discuss in the following subsection. Our results also provide new insights
into the ongoing debate on how to increase the supply and the quality of the work-force in vocational
markets.
1.1 Reconciling di¤erent empirical evidence
Let us start with the market for politicians.
At the European level, Fisman et al. (2012) consider the introduction of a law that equalized the
salaries of the members of the European parliament, starting from 2009. The authors show that doubling
the salary of European politicians decreases the probability that an elected member of the parliament
attended a college ranked among the top 500 in the world by 14 percent. Moreover, a salary increase
seems to attract politicians who shirk more (but this e¤ect, however, is not robust to inclusion of country
xed e¤ects). Overall, their evidence suggests that higher salaries lower the quality of elected members
of the European parliament. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model for
8See Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), Ferraz and Finam (2011) and Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011), among
others.
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the counter-intuitive case (i) arising when there exists a positive and strong association between skills
and motivation in the population of potential workers: under these conditions, a higher wage attracts
workers characterized by lower skills and lower motivation on average.
At the country level, Merlo et al. (2009) study the labor supply of politicians using data on the
Italian parliament. They account that, between 1985 and 2004, the average real total annual income of
Italian legislators grew at an average annual growth rate of 3.8% making politics in Italy a highly lucrative
occupation. Despite this sharp wage increase in the past twenty years, Merlo et al. (2009) show that today
representatives are much less educated than in the past and have a lower outside opportunity. The authors
thus document a negative correlation between what we can interpret as the skills of elected legislators
and the parliamentary wage. Moreover, they study the degree of participation in parliamentary activity
which, in our framework, could be interpreted as a proxy for the intrinsic motivation of elected o¢ cials.
The authors nd no evidence of a positive e¤ect of the wage increase on the degree of participation.
Again, these ndings are consistent with the most striking outcome of our paper, i.e. that higher salaries
can attract less skilled workers.
At the local level, evidence from Italy is di¤erent. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) use data from
Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 showing that higher wages attract more educated and
more e¢ cient candidates. In the same line Ferraz and Finam (2011), examining Brazils municipalities,
showed that higher salaries attract candidates that are more educated and have more experience. Since
the last two papers do not explicitly measure the politiciansmotivation, their evidence is consistent with
both the intuitive situation in which average productivity of active workers increases whereas average
motivation decreases, and with the counter-intuitive case where both average motivation and average
productivity of active workers increase.
Moving from politicians to teachers, let us report results from Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011),
which are consistent with the same two above-mentioned scenarios. Studying the variation in teachers
pay across OECD countries and its signicance for educational outcome, they nd a clear statistical
association between higher relative teacherssalaries and higher standardized pupil scores across countries.
They conclude that better wages attract teachers with higher degrees and improve studentsperformance.
As a consequence, they suggest increasing teacher salaries as a policy measure to help schools to recruit
and retain the higher ability teachers.
Last, but not least, Dal Bò et al. (2013) study a recruitment drive for public sector positions in Mexico.
In their eld experiment both applicantsintellectual ability and motivation are accurately documented.
Intellectual ability is directly measured by the applicantsIQ index and indirectly by their current earning
in the market (the applicants outside opportunity). Motivation is dened as the "inclination towards the
public sector employment" and is measured using Perrys 1996 scale of Public Service Motivation. The
authors show that higher wages attract applicants that are smarter (have a higher IQ index), have better
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personality traits, higher earnings and a better occupational proles. Moreover, they nd no evidence
of adverse selection e¤ects on motivation and, instead, document strong evidence of positive selection as
for reciprocity, engagement in pro-social behaviors and willingness to cooperate. Results from this eld
experiment thus describe a case where higher wages attract workers that are better in terms of both
ability and motivation. In terms of our theoretical model, this selection pattern would document the
counter-intuitive case (ii) that arises when ability and motivation have a positive but weak association
in the population of applicants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model set up and Subsection
2.1 illustrates two alternative specications of the model. In Section 3 we study adverse selection in
the Lemons model with intrinsic motivation. In Section 4 we analyze labor supply by investigating how
average productivity and average motivation of active workers change with the wage rate. In Subsection
4.1 we study the case of a linear relationship between productivity and motivation. We discuss policy
implications in Subsection 4.2. Section 5 concludes. In Appendix A.5 we provide simulations documenting
the intuitive and counter-intuitive cases. In Appendix A.6 we show evidence of a positive dependence
between productivity and vocation in data provided by the Italian survey ICSI 2007.
2 A simple labor market model
Consider a labor market consisting of two di¤erent sectors. In the vocational sector (for instance,
the market for health professionals, teachers, civil servants or politicians) motivated workers obtain a
vocational premium together with their salary. Alternatively, workers may decide to enter an outside-
option sectorwhich is non-vocational, where workers only receive a monetary compensation.
In both sectors rms produce output using a technology in which labor is the only input. Since we
are interested in the supply side of the vocational market, we do not extensively model rmsbehavior.
The risk-neutral potential workers are heterogeneous with respect to both their productivity and their
intrinsic motivation. Workersproductivity is denoted by  and is interpreted as the number of units of
output workers produce if hired in the vocational sector, with  2 ;  ; and 0 <  < . As for vocation
or intrinsic motivation, several ways of modelling it have been proposed in the literature. We follow
Heyes (2005) Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) and Dal Bò et al. (2013) and interpret intrinsic motivation as
a benet accruing to the worker from being employed in the vocational sector, unrelated to the workers
e¤ort or output.9 We denote vocation as  and assume that  2 ;  with 0 =  < :10 By slightly
9Other papers describe motivated workers as people enjoying their personal contribution to the output produced in the
vocational market (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, 2008, Barigozzi and Burani 2013, 2014).
10Our setting is similar to Delfgaauw and Durs model (2010), where the two sectors are the public (vocational) and the
private one. In their model, the two sectors are perfectly competitive and workersability and motivation are fully observable.
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abusing notation,  will correspond to the monetary equivalent of the vocational premium workers obtain
from their job in the vocational sector. Let F (; ), H () and G () ;respectively, be the cumulative joint
distribution function and the marginal distribution functions of the population of potential workers, and
let f(; ), h () and g () be their corresponding probability density functions. Average productivity
and average vocation are thus E [] =
R 

h () d =  and E [] =
R 

g () d =  respectively.
11
Workers aim at maximizing their labor earnings. In the baseline model, workers receive a uniform
wage w in the vocational sector. This assumption has typically two justications: rst, productivity and
vocation are workersprivate information and no screening mechanisms are available to rms; secondly,
in many vocational sectors, contracts are mostly standardized, based upon a uniform wage policy (for
instance, teachers in public schools or nurses in public hospitals) and characterized by a series of pre-
established steps on the career ladder. In the outside-option sector the worker obtains a payo¤ r()
which is thus the opportunity cost to a worker of accepting employment in the vocational sector. The
function r() is assumed to be strictly increasing in , i.e. r0 () > 0, for example because productivity is
rewarded in the outside-option sector. A uniform wage and an outside option rewarding productivity are
the necessary ingredients of the well-known Lemons model which allows to study the problem of adverse
selection in markets.12 However, in the following subsection we will show that this simple Lemons model
can be interpreted as the reduced form for other, more general specications, the most interesting being
the one where productivity is rewarded also in the vocational sector.
Potential applicants accept the job in the vocational sector if the total monetary benet they receive
from the job is larger than their outside option. The total monetary benet to the worker is given by the
wage rate w plus the monetary equivalent of the vocational premium . As a consequence, a potential
applicant with characteristics (; ) accepts the vocational job if and only if he/she receives a total benet
of at least r() (for convenience, we assume that the worker accepts the vocational job in case he/she is
indi¤erent), that is if and only if
w +   r () : (1)
Note that the vocational premium  is uniquely obtained when the worker is hired by rms in the
vocational market. Thus, all else being equal, the higher the workers vocation, the higher the total
benet from the job in the vocational sector.13
We instead extend their analysis considering asymmetric information on both characteristics of potential applicants.
11Barigozzi and Turati (2012) consider the market of nurses in a simpler model with four worker types and provide
somehow extreme results because the two counter-intuitive e¤ects always occurs for a subset of wage rates; which one
prevails depends on the relative impact that productivity and vocation have on the workersreservation wages and on their
ranking.
12See for instance Mas-Colell et al. 1995, chapter 13.
13Note that if  is large enough a worker can decide to accept the job in the vocational sector even when the salary is
w = 0, as for volunteer workers or workers engaged in charity work.
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From inequality (1), we observe that potential workers with low productivity  are more likely to
accept the job (the well-known adverse selection problem on productivity), and potential workers with
high vocation  are more likely to accept the job, as rstly discussed in Heyes (2005) and in Delfgaauw
and Dur (2007). Our aim is to investigate the interaction between these two phenomena studying a
Lemons problem with bidimensional private information.
In the following sections we will compare this Vocational Lemons Model (VLM ) model with the
Standard Lemons Model (SLM ) where intrinsic motivation is irrelevant and does not a¤ect the workers
participation constraint, which is simply given by
w  r(): (2)
For the sake of comparison, the population of potential workers is still described by the distribution
F (; ) even in the SLM.
2.1 Alternative interpretations
The simple Vocational Lemons Model can be seen as the reduced form of other interesting environments.
As illustrated below, two main specications are consistent with the basic VLM if some disadvantage
is attributed to the vocational sector with respect to the alternative one, so that motivated workers still
face a trade-o¤ when choosing which sector to enter.
2.1.1 Incentive scheme in the vocational market
Workers may still self-select into the vocational or the alternative sector but, di¤erently from above, in
both sectors workersremuneration is characterized by a xed part plus an incentive scheme of the form
~wj () = wj + wj ()
where j 2 fV;NV g, with V referring to the vocational sector and NV to the alternative one, where wj
is the xed part of the remuneration whereas wj () is the incentive scheme that rewards the workers
productivity, being w0j () > 0.
The workersparticipation constraint now becomes
wV + wV () +   wNV + wNV () ;
where the left-hand side indicates workersoverall remuneration when accepting the job in the vocational
sector and the right-hand side the workersremuneration when working in the alternative sector. Setting
wV   wNV = w and wNV ()   wV () = r () ; allows us to be back to inequality (1). This shows
that the results that we will provide with the simple VLM still hold as long as the vocational sector is
characterized by lower power of incentives, i.e. w0V () < w
0
NV () ; so that r
0 () > 0.
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The previous inequality is consistent with the fact that vocational markets are frequently characterized
by some institutional constraints and less exibility in designing wage schemes. Moreover, the tasks that
workers are required to perform in vocational markets generally involve some non contractible components
so that workersproductivity is often more di¢ cult to measure with respect to alternative sectors and
tasks.14 Finally, note that low-powered incentives in vocational sectors have been predicted by some
theoretical literature (see, as an example, Handy and Katz 1998 and Besley and Gathak 2005).
2.1.2 Sector-specic disutility from labor
Another possible extension of the baseline VLM is the following. A uniform remuneration wj is o¤ered in
both the vocational and the alternative sectors but workers experience a disutility from labor rj () which
is sector-specic and depends on  in such a way that r0j () < 0. The workers participation constraint
now is:
wV +    rV ()  wNV   rNV ()
The left-hand side indicates the overall workers utility when accepting the job in the vocational sector,
the right-hand side the utility when working in the alternative sector. By writing wV   wNV = w and
rV ()   rNV () = r () we are back again to inequality (1). We now need that 0 > r0V () > r0NV () ;
meaning that workers disutility decreases with productivity faster in the non-vocational sector than in
the vocational one.
3 The Lemons Problem in the vocation-based labor market
In this Section, we compare the ine¢ ciency caused by adverse selection in the VLM, basically described
by participation constraint (1) with the SLM described by participation constraint (2).
In the Standard Lemons Model, the workersentry decision in the relevant market depends on their
productivity level  in a way that adversely a¤ects the rms operating in that sector. Since the outside
option is larger for more capable workers, i.e. since r0 () > 0, only relatively less productive workers are
14The quality of services is particularly relevant in vocational jobs and is typically non-contractible (although it is
observable by the recipients of services) and thus it is not rewarded directly. Consider for example a nurse asked to
administer a particular number of injections: the quality of the service he/she provides increases if the injections are
administered with tender loving care. However, a nurse is not rewarded for being tender. Examples of non-contractible
quality levels in the market for health professionals are provided in McGuire (2008, page 281): While time is one concrete
candidate for what is meant by non-contractible quality as an input into patient health, diligence, responsiveness, and
attentiveness can be thought of in the same category as well.. In the same way, a lecturer can be contracted to deliver a
course, but being available for hallway conversation, motivating students and reinforcing their learning process is essentially
voluntary and not rewarded. At school, quality of teaching is higher if a teacher promotes curiosity and creative thinking
and renes studentsoral and written communication skills, but this goes beyond his/her explicit duties.
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willing to accept the job in the relevant sector at any given wage; the most productive workers opt-out
and are employed in the alternative sector. This translates into an ine¢ ciently low level of output when,
for instance, the production technology in the relevant sector is not inferior to the one of the alternative
sector.
Let us call marginal workers those workers who are indi¤erent between accepting the job in the
relevant sector or opting out. In the Standard Lemons Model, let ^ be the productivity of marginal
workers model, i.e. let ^ be is such that r(^) = w: Thus ^ = r 1(w): Similarly, in the Vocational Lemons
Model, let (~; ~) be the characteristics of marginal workers, i.e. let (~; ~) be such that r(~) = w+~: Thus,
~ = r 1(w + ~): Note that ~ = ^ for ~ = 0:
Denition 1 Given a salary w0; in the VLM, the curve of marginal workers is
 () = r()  w0:
In Figure 1, the set of potential workers is represented in the plane (; ) for a concave function r ().
The curve of indi¤erent workers splits the set of potential workers into two regions and r() and w0 are
such that sup = r 1(w0+) < ; where sup is the highest productivity level of workers accepting the job
in the vocational sector for a given salary w0.15 Obviously, the shaded area indicates all types accepting
the job in the vocational sector given the salary w0, the complementary region indicates types refusing
the rmso¤ers and opting out.16
Insert Figure 1 around here
Note that, in the SLM, given a salary w0, active workers in the standard sector are simply indicated by
the rectangle with sides (r 1(w0)  ) and  (see again Figure 1).
Observation 1 Given a salary w0, both employment and average productivity of active workers in the
relevant sector are higher in the VLM than in the SLM: EV LM [ j w0] > ESLM [ j w0].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The previous observation implies that adverse selection has a stronger impact in the SLM than in the
VLM. Namely, whatever is the degree of ine¢ ciency observed in the SLM, such ine¢ ciency is necessarily
reduced in the VLM. In particular, by dening the function r () characterized by r 1 (w0) = r 1(w0)
and r ()  r () 8; we are then able to add what follows.
15Depending on the function r()  w0, sup can be lower or equal to : In other words, sup  min

r 1(w0 + ); 
	
:
16A similar graphical representation is provided in Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) in the case of full information on workers
characteristics and endogenous reservation wage (see also Footnote 10).
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Corollary 1 (i) Workersmotivation reduces the ine¢ ciency caused by adverse selection with respect to
the SLM. (ii) Conditional on a given wage rate w0, the outside-option function r() is associated with a
level of e¢ ciency lower than r ().
Proof. (i) Directly follows from Observation 1. (ii) Given all  2 ;  ; the larger r 1(w0 + ); the
larger the number of workers with  > ^ = r 1(w0) preferring to enter the relevant sector rather than
the outside option sector and, thus, the lower the production ine¢ ciency due to adverse selection. The
number of workers with  > r 1(w0) = r 1 (w0) entering the relevant market is higher with r () than
with r ().
Corollary 1 shows that the outside-option function r() plays a crucial role in dening the extent of
the di¤erence between average productivity of active workers in the VLM and average productivity in
the SLM. In particular, we observe that, the atter is the curve, the larger the average productivity of
active workers in the VLM.
The intuition behind this result can be outlined as follows. Consider a set of potential workers with
high ability and high motivation and their decision whether to enter the vocation-based market or not at
a wage rate w0. Potential workers with high ability and high vocation receive the wage w0 which does
not reward their high level of productivity. Nevertheless, they obtain their (high) vocational premium.
When the reservation wage function is almost at, the return to skills outside the vocational sector is
low. This implies that, in the alternative sector, an increase in productivity has a minor impact on the
workerspayo¤. Thus, working in the vocational sector becomes more attractive. When, on the contrary,
the reservation wage function is steep, the return to skills outside the vocational sector is high so that
working in the vocational sector becomes less attractive.
Note that, if the return to skills outside the vocational sector was completely at, i.e. if r() was a
horizontal line and the salary was uniform both inside and outside the vocational sector, then production
ine¢ ciencies due to adverse selection would be the lowest possible. Finally, consider the opposite extreme
case in which the return to skills outside the relevant sector is assumed to be innitely high (i.e. suppose
r() is a vertical line). In this case, vocation would not a¤ect workersdecision on whether to accept the
job in the vocational sector or opt out. Thus, production ine¢ ciencies due to adverse selection would be
the same in the VLM and in the SLM.
4 How the wage rate a¤ects the pool of active workers
We study here how the composition of the active work-force in the vocational sector changes with the
wage rate.17 This analysis will provide important insights to understand labor supply in vocational labor
17To justify that the workersreservation wage r() remains xed also when salary in the vocation-based sector changes,
we assume that the size of the vocation-based sector is small with respect to the outside-option sector. Thus, changes in
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markets.
Note that, as the wage rate marginally increases and shifts to w0+dw0, the curve of indi¤erent workers
 () = r() w0 moves towards the bottom-right side of Figure 1. Thus, as the wage rate increases, we
expect that workers with lower and lower vocation enter the vocational market, or that the impact on
the average vocation of active workers is negative. In the same way, we expect that workers with higher
and higher productivity enter the vocational market, so that we expect that the average productivity of
active workers increases in the wage rate.18 However, we are going to see that the interplay of vocation
and productivity in the workersparticipation constraint determines workerswillingness to accept the
job, so that the counter-intuitive cases are also possible: average vocation can be increasing and average
productivity can be decreasing in the wage rate.
We rst show that average productivity of active workers in the relevant sector is always increasing
in the wage rate in the SLM. We will then analyze the case of the VLM.
Remark 1 In the SLM, (i) the impact of a marginal increase in wage on marginal workersproductivity
^ = r 1(w0) is positive and equal to 1r0(^) : (ii) Average productivity of active workers in the standard
sector is monotonically increasing in the wage.
Proof. See the Appendix A.2.
When the salary increases, more productive workers accept the job in the SLM and average produc-
tivity among active workers monotonically increases (see the dotted line in Figure 2).
Insert gure 2 around here
We now turn to the VLM. We will show that the association between  and  is crucial in determining
whether counter-intuitive e¤ects occur.
From Observation 1 we know that, for every value of w; the average productivity of active workers
is weakly larger in the VLM, i.e. EV LM [ j w]  ESLM [ j w]. Thus, as Figure 2 shows, the function
EV LM [ j w] necessarily lies above the function ESLM [ j w] : The dashed curve shows the case in which
EV LM [ j w] is monotonically increasing in the wage rate and the continuous curve the case in which the
counter-intuitive e¤ect (i) for average productivity occurs for every value of the possible wage rates, or
in which EV LM [ j w] is monotonically decreasing in the wage rate.
To understand why counter-intuitive e¤ects may occur, consider the following special case.
Example 1 Perfect correlation between  and  and linear r (). Suppose that the correlation
between ability and motivation is perfect, i.e. all potential applicants can be represented through the line
 () =  1 () ; and suppose that r () is linear.
wage in the small sector do not a¤ect wages in the larger one.
18See Remark 4 below.
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 Average productivity of active workers. Consider the line    () : Marginal workers are
dened by w = r ()    () : By totally di¤erentiating the previous equation we obtain: ddw =
1
r0() 0() : Thus, 
0 () < 0 is a su¢ cient condition such that ddw > 0, whereas 
0 () > 0 is a
necessary condition such that ddw < 0: Moreover,
d
dw < 0 if and only if r
0 () < 0 () :
 Average vocation of active workers. Consider the line    () : Marginal workers are dened
by w = r ( ())   : By totally di¤erentiating the previous equation we obtain: ddw = 1r0()0() 1 :
Thus, 0 () < 0 is a su¢ cient condition such that ddw < 0, whereas 
0 () > 0 is a necessary
condition such that ddw > 0: Moreover,
d
dw > 0 if and only if r
0 () > 10() = 
0 () :
The previous example shows that counter-intuitive e¤ects can be observed only when the correlation
between ability and motivation is positive. Moreover, the two counter-intuitive e¤ects

d
dw < 0 and
d
dw > 0

do not occur jointly: either applicantsaverage productivity is decreasing or average intrinsic motivation
is increasing in the salary. Finally, the counter-intuitive e¤ects displayed by the VLM depend on the
relative magnitude of the slopes of the line of marginal workers r0 () and the line of potential workers
0 (). In fact, when r0 () > 0 () > 0; the net reservation wage r ()   of workers with low skills and
low motivation is lower than the net reservation wage of workers with high skills and high motivation19 .
As a consequence, as the wage rate increases, types with higher and higher skills and higher and higher
motivation progressively enter the vocational market. On the contrary, when 0 () > r0 () > 0, workers
with high skills and high motivation have a lower net reservation wage than workers with low skills and
low motivation, so that, as the wage increases, the quality of workers progressively deteriorates in the
vocational sector.
The following remark summarizes the previous observations.
Remark 2 Perfect correlation between  and  and linear r () :
(a) A negative correlation between ability and motivation is a su¢ cient condition for the two intuitive
e¤ects: E [ j w] is monotonically increasing and E [ j w] is monotonically decreasing in the wage
rate.
(b) A positive correlation between ability and motivation is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for one of
the two counter-intuitive e¤ects to occur: (i) if 0 () > r0 () > 0, then both E [ j w] and E [ j w]
are monotonically decreasing in the wage rate; conversely (ii) if r0 () > 0 () > 0, then both
E [ j w] and E [ j w] are monotonically increasing in the wage rate.
19Take two points (workers) (1; 1) and (2; 2) on the line  () ; where 2 > 1; 2 > 1 and 
0 () > 0: Net reservation
wages for the workers represented by the two previous points are: r (1)  1 and r (2)  2; respectively. The inequality
r0 () > 0 () implies that r (2) r (1) > 2 1 or that the net reservation wage of worker 2 is larger than that of worker
1. Similarly, inequality r0 () < 0 () implies that the net reservation wage of worker 1 is larger than that of worker 2.
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Example 1 and the above Remark 2 already generalize the results of the theoretical model presented
in Dal Bò et al. (2013). In their Proposition 1, they state that an increase in wages increases the average
ability of the applicant pooland that it also increases the average motivation of the pool if a perfect,
positive and strong correlation between ability and motivation exists. Such results, together with the
conditions guaranteeing them, perfectly parallel those described in part b (ii) of Remark 2. Di¤erently
from Dal Bò et al. (2013), our Example 1 also shows that a positive association between ability and
motivation is fully compatible with the more striking case of average ability of active workers being
decreasing in the wage rate (see part b (i) of the Remark 2). But there is much more to that.
In Proposition 1 below, we provide su¢ cient conditions that allow for counter-intuitive e¤ects in the
VLM to occur, where we consider a general joint probability distribution for  and  and a non-linear
function r () :
The proof of the Proposition is based on the observation that a su¢ cient condition for EV LM [ j w]
being decreasing in w for a non-empty set of wage levels is that there exists a salary w0 such that
EV LM [ j w0] > . In fact, EV LM [ j w] converges to  for w su¢ ciently high. In the same way, a
su¢ cient condition for EV LM [ j w] being increasing in w for a non-empty set of wage levels is that a
salary w00 exists such that EV LM [ j w00] <  ; in fact, EV LM [ j w] converges to  for w su¢ ciently
high.
We rst introduce the following denition.
Denition 2 (a) Let A1;w0 [ A2;w0 denote the set of all workers entering the vocational market at the
salary w0. Let A1;w0 be the subset of workers with productivity below the population average, i.e. such
that   E[] = ; instead, let A2;w0 be the subset of workers with productivity above the population
average, i.e.   E[] = .
(b) In the same way, let B1;w00 [ B2;w00 denote the set of all workers entering the vocational market at
the salary w00. Let B1;w00 be the subset of workers with motivation below the population average, i.e.
such that   E[] =  ; instead, let B2;w00 be the subset of workers with motivation above the population
average, i.e.   E[] =  .
It immediately follows from the above denition that: (a) E[ j A2;w0 ] >  and E[ j A1;w0 ] < 
and P (A1;w0) = 1   P (A2;w0), where P denotes the probability associated with each subset; (b) E[ j
B2;w00 ] >  and E[ j B1;w00 ] <  ; moreover, P (B2;w00) = 1  P (B1;w00):
Proposition 1 (Su¢ cient conditions for counter-intuitive results)
 If a wage w0 exists such that
P (A2;w0)
1  P (A2;w0)
  E[ j A1;w0 ]  
E[ j A2;w0 ]  
; (3)
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then E[ j w0] >  and a non-empty subset of wage levels exists in which E[ j w] is decreasing in
the wage rate.
 If a wage w00 exists such that
P (B1;w00)
1  P (B1;w00)
  E[ j B2;w00 ]  
E[ j B1;w00 ]  
; (4)
then E[ j w00] <  and a non-empty subset of wage levels exists in which E[ j w] is increasing
in the wage rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Note that the left-hand side of inequality (3) is always positive and unbounded, whereas the quantity
on the right-hand side is positive and nite as long as  <1. So, a salary w0 that satises the condition
may exist. Indeed, in the simulations briey discussed in the next subsection, we show that condition (3)
can be veried for the whole set of wage levels.
Similarly, the left-hand side of inequality (4) is always positive and unbounded, whereas the quantity
on the right-hand side is positive and nite as long as  < 1. So, again, a wage w00 that satises the
condition may exist. Again, in the simulations we show that condition (4) can be veried for the whole
set of wage levels.
Inequality (3) states that, for a given wage rate w0, the counter-intuitive e¤ect on the average pro-
ductivity of active workers in the vocational sector occurs if: (i) the probability of observing highly
productive workers P (A2;w0) is greater than the probability of observing below-average productivity
workers, 1   P (A2;w0); (ii) the ratio of the two previous probabilities is greater than the ratio of the
distances of the two conditional means, E[ j A1;w0 ] and E[ j A2;w0 ]; with respect to the marginal mean.
Thus, not only should the probability P (A2;w0) be large enough to yield E[ j w] decreasing in wage, but
the average  in A2;w0 should be su¢ ciently greater than , while the average  in A1;w0 has to be close
enough to : In a nutshell, condition (3) requires a large number of applicants in the vocational sector
characterized by an average productivity su¢ ciently greater than the population average .
Condition (4) follows the same logic and requires a su¢ ciently large number of applicants in the
vocational sector characterized by an average motivation su¢ ciently lower than the population average
 .
Note that condition (3) requires a positive association between  and  conditional on w0: Similarly,
condition (4) asks for a positive association between  and  conditional on w00: In turn, both conditions
are consistent with the hypothesis of a strong positive association between  and . In fact, condition
(3) requires a large mass in the upper-right part of the set of potential workers, while condition (4) holds
if a large mass is associated with the bottom-left part of the set of potential workers.
16
Moreover, if the distribution of  and  is characterized by a positive association, then we must
conclude that the two counter-intuitive e¤ects cannot occur together.
Remark 3 Suppose a positive association between ability and motivation exists. As the wage rate in-
creases, E[ j w] and E[ j w] must move in the same direction: either both increase or both decrease.
In fact, (3) implies that workers entering the market for a salary larger than w0 are characterized by
below-average productivity levels. Then E[ j w] falls. Furthermore, if cov(;  j w0) > 0 also workers
with vocation levels below the average are simultaneously entering the market and then E[ j w > w0]
must also decrease. Similarly, if condition (4) holds, workers with above-average motivation are entering
the market for wages larger than w00 and then E[ j w] must increase. However, a positive covariance
between  and  conditional on w00 implies that workers with above-average productivity are entering
the market as well. As a consequence, E[ j w > w00] must also increase. Thus, the two counterintuitive
e¤ects cannot occur together.20
Following the same reasoning, when the association between  and  is negative and when we consider
active workers conditional on the wage w0, then either E[ j w > w0] is increasing and E[ j w > w0]
is decreasing in wage, or the opposite pattern occurs. As already mentioned, we expect both intuitive
e¤ects to occur in the latter case. The following remark conrms our intuition.
Remark 4 Intuitive e¤ects are consistent with a negative association between productivity and motiva-
tion.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In the following Section and in line with Remark 2, we provide a simple and intuitive condition to
discriminate between the two counter-intuitive cases (decreasing average ability and increasing average
motivation), which is based on the relative magnitude of the correlation between  and  and of the slope
of the return to ability r ().
Finally, let us underline the relationship between the results contained in this section and in the
previous one. Corollary 1 states that intrinsic motivation leads to an overall increase in the average
productivity of active workers so that EV LM [ j w] lies above ESLM [ j w] for every possible w and
ine¢ ciencies due to adverse selection are mitigated. In general, the distance between EV LM [ j w] and
ESLM [ j w] decreases with the wage rate and goes to zero when the wage is so high that all potential
workers enter the relevant market in both models. Obviously, the distance between the two curves also
20Contrasting again our analysis with Dal Bò et al. (2013), note that Condition (4), which implies that a non-empty subset
of wage levels exists such that E[ j w] is increasing in w, generalizes the theoretical predictions of their model to a general
joint distribution of workers ability and motivation. Moreover, we are also able to explain the striking counter-intuitive
result generated by Condition (3).
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depends on whether Condition (3) is or is not veried. This can be seen in Figure 2. The monotonically
decreasing curve indicates EV LM [ j w] when Condition (3) holds for every value of the wage rate,
whereas the monotonically increasing dashed curve describes the intuitive case. In particular, when
EV LM [ j w] decreases in the wage rate, the distance between EV LM [ j w] and ESLM [ j w] is larger
and intrinsic motivation reduces adverse selection ine¢ ciencies even more. Intuitively, this occurs since
the distribution of productivity and motivation in the population of potential workers is such that a large
number of workers with high ability and high motivation enter the vocational market for low levels of the
wage rate. Conversely, for the same wage levels, only low-productivity workers enter the relevant market
in the SLM.
4.1 Linear relationship between  and 
In the previous section we considered two extreme cases: perfect correlation between  and  (see Example
1) and a general distribution of  and  (see Proposition 1). In this subsection, we deal with the convenient
and practical case of a linear relationship between the two variables. We rst briey discuss the results
from some simulations (that are described in detail in Appendix A.5) and then we re-interpret the
statement of Proposition 1.
In Appendix A.5, we considered a sample of 200,000 subjects with characteristic (i; i) from a
truncated bivariate Gaussian random variable dened in

; 
  ;  ; such that E[] = +2 and
E[] =
+
2 . The curve of marginal workers is linear. A linear dependence between  and  exists and
the sign of the slope of the regression line, b, is determined by the sign of cov(; ): Expected values of 
and  given the wage level w are computed through Monte Carlo integration.
Panels A and D in Figure 3 show a case where E[ j w]; as well as E[ j w]; is monotonically decreasing
in w. This means that Condition (3) is veried for all w: Panel B, instead, shows a case where E[ j w]
and E[ j w] are both monotonically increasing, implying that Condition (4) is veried for all the possible
values of the wage rate. Finally, panel C depicts intuitive e¤ects.
To obtain the four scenarios described in Figure 3, we changed the covariance between  and ; the
slope of the regression line and the slope of the outside option function. In particular, panels A, B and
D are obtained by taking cov(; ) > 0; panel C by choosing cov(; ) < 0: According to Remark 2, to
obtain panels A and D, we have chosen a slope of the outside option function lower than that of the
regression line; the opposite to obtain panel B.
Insert Figure 3 about here
We are now able explain the link between Conditions (3) and (4) in Proposition 1 and the conditions
outlined in Remark 2. We consider here Case A, which is characterized by both E[ j w] and E[ j w]
decreasing in the wage rate; Case B is treated in Appendix A.5. In Figure 4, the whole set of potential
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workers is represented, together with the average values of  and ; the regression line and the line of
marginal workers dened by a wage rate set equal to 3. The line of marginal workers divides the set of
active workers into the two subsets, A1;w0=3 and A2;w0=3; described in Denition 2. Figure 4 shows that
Condition (3) is likely to be veried for w0 = 3; because P (A2;w0=3) is larger than (1   P (A2;w0=3)):
Moreover, the subset A2;w0=3 clearly contains the more skilled and more motivated workers so that,
when the wage rate increases, workers with lower skills and lower motivation will necessarily enter the
market. Finally, note that Condition (4) is not veried for w0 = 3; P (B1;w0=3) being clearly lower than
(1  P (B1;w0=3)):
Insert Figure 4 about here
Interestingly, for a given w0 and a linear dependence in mean between  and , a large mass in
the subset A2;w0 (or a positive conditional covariance between the two variables, cov(;  j w0) > 0) is
consistent with the following two features: (i) a positive covariance, cov(; ) > 0; and (ii) a slope of the
regression line that is larger than the slope of the line of marginal workers. In fact, as Figure 4 shows,
when the slope of the regression line is larger than the slope of the line of marginal workers, then a large
mass of workers, that are active in the vocational market given w0, is located in the upper-right part of
the whole set of workers. Of course, (i) and (ii) are not su¢ cient to prove Proposition 1 because they do
not contain information on the gap between the conditional mean and the marginal mean, E[ j Ai;w0 ]
and , respectively. However, (i) and (ii) provide some practical conditions suggesting when inequality
(3) is satised.
In Example 1, because of perfect correlation, a positive covariance is necessary and su¢ cient to ensure
that one counter-intuitive result occurs; the relative magnitude of the slope of the line of marginal workers
and that of the regression line determines which one of the two e¤ects realizes. On the contrary, for a
more general distribution function, a positive covariance and the relative magnitude of the two slopes are
no longer su¢ cient conditions. Thus, we can state the following:
Remark 5 Assume a linear relationship between  and ; that is let  = a+ b+~", where ~" is an error
term with zero mean and b = cov(;)var() : When cov(; ) > 0, then one of two counter-intuitive results may
occur: (i) when r0() < b; average productivity of active workers can be decreasing in the wage rate for a
non-empty subset of wage levels; (ii) when r0() > b, average vocation of active workers can be increasing
in the wage rate for a non-empty subset of wage levels.
As discussed in Subsection 2.1.1, note that our results can be naturally extended to a vocational
market where incentive schemes are in place, provided that the return to ability is lower in the vocational
market than in the non-vocational one. In this case, r0() must be interpreted as the di¤erence in the
power of incentives o¤ered by rms in the two sectors.
19
Finally, observe that, in the simulations, the return to ability has been assumed to be linear, implying
that, for every , either r0() < b or r0() > b is true and that monotonicity of E[ j w] and E[ j w] is
possible. Instead, when r00() 6= 0, we expect more complicate patterns since the relative magnitude of
r0() and b might well change with . This prevents monotonicity but does not a¤ect our results.
In Appendix A.6, we provide some evidence that productivity and motivation are characterized by a
positive conditional dependence cov(;  j w0) > 0, using data provided by the Italian survey ICSI 2007.
In particular, we consider the employees of the Italian cooperatives analyzed in the survey, that is,
workers that entered the vocational market at a given salary. The ICSI survey includes the question
How do you dene your employer-employee relationship with the cooperative?, the answer to which
can be considered as a proxy for workersmotivation. Moreover, as a proxy for the workersproductivity,
we consider bonuses and cash prizes that they receive as an extra earning with respect to their monthly
wage.21 It is worth noting that we do not interpret the association between motivation and productivity
as causal, but simply as documenting their statistical connection.
4.2 Policy implications: an example
Suppose that, given the current wage scheme in place in the vocational sector, the policy-maker observes
a shortage of workers, as it actually occurs in the market for nurses in many countries22 . Our paper
shows that a wage increase as a policy to deal with the shortage has an important potential drawback.
Indeed, when Condition (3) holds, the average ability of active workers can deteriorate, since higher
salaries may attract less skilled workers. This undesirable outcome, that a policy-maker is willing to
avoid, occurs when a positive and strong association between skills and vocation exists. Moreover, not
only do higher salaries trigger a decrease in the average ability of the work-force, but also a decrease
of average motivation: thus increasing wages deteriorates the quality of workers with respect to both
dimensions.
The statistical relationship between motivation and productivity in the case of potential nurses could
be measured using data collected, for example, from students attending nursing schools.23 Our analy-
21Our empirical results are coherent with the literature on public administration showing that public service motivation is
positively correlated with job performance in the public sector (see Petrovsky 2009, Na¤ and Crum 1999, Park and Rainey
2008, Ritz 2009 and Steijn 2008). Moreover, Freeman (1997) nds evidence of positive dependence between productivity
and vocation. The author considers volunteer workers, or the ones who are willing to work for nothing. In our model they
are the ones with either a very high motivation or a very low outside option, or both. He shows that volunteers are indeed
workers with high productivity and characterized by a high opportunity-cost to engage in the working-for-nothing activity.
This suggests that many potential workers with characteristics close to (; ) exist, so that a positive dependence between
productivity and vocation may result at least for high-productivity levels.
22See, among others, Antonazzo et al. 2003; Shields 2004; Simoens et al. 2005.
23See Amabile et al. (1994) for a Work Preference Inventory consisting of 30 questions designed to assess college students
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sis indicates that, given a negative association between motivation and productivity conditional on the
wage, higher salaries will attract nurses with higher skills but lower motivation. Given a positive as-
sociation, instead, we are able to distinguish between the two counter-intuitive results. In particular,
a low (strong) positive association between ability and motivation is likely to correspond to a positive
(negative) relationship between the wage rate and the ability of active workers.
Another example from the market for politicians is briey mentioned in the Conclusion which follows.
5 Conclusion
Do higher salaries always attract more productive workers? We have shown that this is not necessarily
the case when workers are heterogeneous with respect to two characteristics, productivity and motivation.
Our theoretical analysis identies simple conditions such that a negative relationship between the wage
rate and workersability exists, based on the distribution of the two characteristics in the population
of potential workers. In particular, when there is a negative association between workersability and
motivation and when the two characteristics are independently distributed, the intuitive scenario occurs
where wages attract more productive but less motivated workers. When the correlation between workers
ability and motivation is positive but not too strong, then a wage increase attracts more productive
workers (as expected), and also the more motivated ones, the best scenario. With a su¢ ciently strong and
positive correlation between productivity and motivation, a wage increase may have a serious drawback
because it attracts not only less motivated workers, but also less productive employees.
As such, our model provides a general and unifying explanation about apparently contrasting evidence
documented in di¤erent environments, which the theoretical literature studying vocational sectors was
still missing. Namely, our results account for why increasing the wage rate attracts more skilled teachers
and civil servants but (in some cases) less productive politicians.
Our ndings have also important policy implications. For instance, in some countries, it is currently
debated whether remuneration of elected representatives should be reduced. Since the existing evidence
has shown (in the European Union and Italy) that higher remuneration tends to be associated with less
skilled Members of Parliaments, our model suggests that a reduction in the parliamentary wage could
be indeed an appropriate policy measure not only to reduce inequity, as the advocates of the reform
assert, but also to increase the quality of politicians. The e¤ects of wage policies ultimately rest on the
correlation between ability and vocation in the population of potential workers, so that these policies
should be supported by sector-specic knowledge of the association properties of the two characteristics.
overall intrinsic and extrinsic motivation toward their work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Observation 1
Given w0, the marginal workersproductivity in the Standard Lemons Model (SLM) is ^ = r 1(w0): For
the same wage, the productivity level of marginal workers in the Vocational Lemons Model (VLM) is
~ = r 1(w0 + ~). We can compare productivity of the marginal workers in the two models. Since the
function r() is strictly increasing and ~  0; it is r 1(w0+~)  r 1(w0): Thus ~ = ^ for ~ = 0 and ~ > ^
for ~ > 0: In other words: for every strictly positive ~ and r () < w0 < r
 


, in the VLM marginal
workers have higher productivity than in the SLM.
We now compare average productivity of active workers given w0, in the VLM and in the SLM.
Lets consider the case where  > r 1(w0 + ) or  > sup as in Figure 1, where sup is the highest
productivity level of workers accepting the job for a given salary w0. The same reasoning can be applied
when  < r 1(w0 + ) or  = sup:
The probability that workers enter the market at a given salary w0 in the SLM is
A =
Z 

Z r 1(w0)

f (; ) dd;
whereas the probability that workers enter the market conditional on w0 in the VLM is A+B; where
B =
Z 

Z r 1(w0+)
r 1(w0)
f (; ) dd:
In particular, the expected value of  given the salary w0 in the SLM is
ESLM [ jw0 ] =
R 

hR r 1(w0)

f (; ) d
i
d
A
=
A0
A
and the expected value of  given w0 in the VLM is
EV LM [ jw0 ] =
R 

R r 1(w0)
 f(;)d

d+
R 

R r 1(w0+)
r 1(w0)
f(;)d

d
A+B =
A0+B0
A+B
We now prove that EV LM [ jw0 ]  ESLM [ jw0 ] 8w0, or
A0 +B0
A+B
 A
0
A
:
The previous condition can be rewritten as follows
B0
B
 A
0
A
: (5)
The ratio B
0
B is the expected value of  in the interval
 
r 1(w0); r 1(w0 + )

, while A
0
A is the expected
value of  in
 
; r 1(w0)

. The two expected values lie respectively in the two intervals that are not
overlapping and then B
0
B 2
 
r 1(w0); r 1(w0 + )

and A
0
A 2
 
; r 1(w0)

. Inequality (5) is thus always
valid, for any given w0; provided that the probabilities A and B are di¤erent from zero.
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A.2 Proof of Remark 1
(i) Marginal workers in the SLM are ^ : r(^)   w = 0: By totally di¤erentiating the previous equation
with respect to ^ and w one gets r0(^)d   dw = 0: Since the function r() is strictly increasing, the
rst claim is obtained. Obviously, the higher the slope of the outside option function r(), the lower the
impact of a wage increase on the productivity level of marginal types. (ii) From the proof of Observation
1, the average productivity of active workers when the wage is w0 can be written as follows
ESLM [ jw0 ] =
R 

hR r 1(w0)

f (; ) d
i
dR 

R r 1(w0)

f (; ) dd
Since h () =
R 

f (; ) d, we can write
ESLM [ jw0 ] =
R r 1(w0)

h () dR r 1(w0)

h () d
:
We now compute the derivative of ESLM [ jw0 ] with respect to the wage rate and we show that it is
always increasing
@
@w0
ESLM [ jw0 ] =
h(r 1(w0))r 1(w0)
@r 1(w0)
@w0
R r 1(w0)
 h()d h(r 1(w0))
@r 1(w0)
@w0
R r 1(w0)
 h()dhR r 1(w0)
 h()d
i2
The sign of @@w0ESLM [ jw0 ] is the same as the sign of the numerator (N) of the previous expression. N
can be rewritten as
N = h(r 1(w0))
@r 1(w0)
@w0
"Z r 1(w0)


r 1(w0)h ()  h ()

d
#
Since the function r() is increasing and  2 ; r 1 (w0) ; N is always non-negative.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Lets consider the proof for the rst part of the Proposition. The proof of the second part is equivalent
and therefore omitted.
Consider the expected productivity of subjects entering the market for w = w0;24 E[ j w0], that is
equal to
E[ j w0] =
Z r 1(+w0)

Z 

p(;  j w0) d d +
Z r 1(+w0)
r 1(+w0)
Z 
r() w0
p(;  j w0) d d
24Without loss of generality, here we consider the case dened both in Figure 1 and in Appendix A.1, where  > r 1(w0+)
or  > sup.
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where
p(;  j w0) = p(; )R r 1(+w0)

R 

p(;  j w0) d d +
R r 1(+w0)
r 1(+w0)
R 
r() w0 p(;  j w0) d d
The law of iterated expectations allows us to write
E[jw0] = P (A1;w0)E[ j A1;w0 ] + P (A2;w0)E[ j A2;w0 ]
where the two non-overlapping subsets A1;w0 and A2;w0 described in Denition 2 are such that A1;w0 [
A2;w0 is the set of workers entering the market at a given salary w0.
Note that, given w0, if the condition
E[ j w0] = (1  P (A2;w0))E[ j A1;w0 ] + P (A2;w0)E[ j A2;w0 ]   (6)
holds, then the conditional expectation must be decreasing in the wage rate for w > w0. In fact,
EV LM [ j w] necessarily converges to  for w su¢ ciently high.
Dene 1 = E[ j A1;w0 ]    and 2 = E[ j A2;w0 ]    which are negative and positive numbers
respectively. It is obvious that if (6) holds, then necessarily
(1  P (A2;w0)) 1 + P (A2;w0)2 > 0
which is equivalent to inequality (3).
A.4 Proof of Remark 4
Let us consider the curve of marginal workers r ()   w0: The set of active workers conditional on w0
can be divided in 4 subsets, Aw0 ; Bw0 ; C1;w0 and C2;w0 ; where Aw0 is such that E ( j Aw0) > 
and E ( j Aw0) >  ; Bw0 is such that E ( j Bw0) <  and E ( j Bw0) <  ; C1;w0 is such that
E ( j C1;w0) <  and E ( j C1;w0) >  ; and nally C2;w0 is such that E ( j C2;w0) >  and
E ( j C2;w0) <  : Then P (Aw0); P (Bw0); P (C1;w0) and P (C2;w0) indicate the respective probabili-
ties which add up to one.
Without loss of generality, suppose that w0 is su¢ ciently small that the subset C2;w0 is empty. Average
productivity for a xed w0 is
E[ j w0] = P (C1;w0)E[ j C1;w0 ] + P (Bw0)E[ j Bw0 ] + P (Aw0)E[ j Aw0 ] (7)
where, by denition, E[ j Bw0 ] and E[ j C1;w0 ] are lower while E[ j Aw0 ] is larger than :
In the same way, average motivation conditional on w0 is
E[ j w0] = P (C1;w0)E[ j C1;w0 ] + P (Bw0)E[ j Bw0 ] + P (Aw0)E[ j Aw0 ] (8)
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where, by denition, E[ j Bw0 ] is smaller while E[ j C1;w0 ] and E[ j Aw0 ] are bigger than  :
Average productivity and average motivation of active workers converge to  and to  ; respectively,
for w0 large enough. Thus, two necessary conditions to observe both (monotonic) intuitive e¤ects are
E[ j w0]   8w0
E[ j w0]   8w0
; (9)
implying that E[ j w0] converges to  from below and E[ j w0] converges to  from above.
Expressions (7) and (8) are jointly compatible with conditions in (9) if and only if the rst term in
the two expressions is large while the second and the third terms are small; or if P (C1;w0) is high while
P (Bw0) and P (Aw0) are low for every possible level of the wage rate. This requires a negative association
between productivity and motivation because it means a large mass in the upper-left part of the set of
potential workers together with a small mass in the upper-right and in the bottom-left part of the set of
potential workers.
A.5 Simulations
To show evidence of intuitive and counter-intuitive phenomena, we set a Monte Carlo experiment. In
particular, we provide some examples in which counter-intuitive e¤ects are possible both for expected
productivity E[ j w] as well as for expected intrinsic motivation E[ j w]. Without loss of generality, we
set  = 0,  = 10,  = 0 and  = 5. We also assume that the marginal expected values are E[] = +2 and
E[] =
+
2 . Marginal standard errors have been chosen to keep the truncation rate of our Monte Carlo
experiment lower than the 5%. We thus simulated di¤erent scenarios, by considering di¤erent slopes of
the curve of marginal workers and di¤erent levels of correlation. To keep the intuition of our experiment
as simple as possible, we consider a linear curve of marginal workers, that is, r() =  and we also refer
to the linear dependence between  and  described by  = a+ b+~", where ~" is an error term with zero
mean and b = cov(;)var() . Obviously, b is constant and its sign is determined by the sign of cov(; ):
For each experiment, we simulated a sample of 200,000 subjects with characteristic (i; i) from
a bivariate Gaussian random variable dened on the joint domain of the two dimensions considered.
Expected values of  and  given the wage level w are computed through Monte Carlo integration.
We refer to Remark 2 and rst consider the case where the slope of the line of marginal workers is
lower than the regression slope, by setting b = 1:7 and  = 1:5. Panel A in Figure 3 shows that E[ j w]
as well as E[ j w] are decreasing. Thus, we observe a counter-intuitive behavior for the expected .
In the second scenario, we keep the slope of the line of marginal workers  = 1:5 unchanged, while we
decrease the slope of the regression line so that b = 0:6. In this case, the line of marginal workers is thus
steeper than the linear relation. Panel B in Figure 3 shows an increasing expected productivity and an
increasing expected vocation. Therefore, in this scenario, we observe a counter-intuitive behavior for the
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expected .
If we take the very same experiment and uniquely switch the sign of the covariance (from positive
to negative), both intuitive e¤ects occur. In particular, we assume b =  0:6 and  = 1:5. In Panel C
of Figure 3 we nd evidence for an increasing average productivity and a decreasing average vocation of
active workers.
Finally, we consider the same slope for the regression line as in case B, namely b = 0:6; together with
a lower coe¢ cient,  = 0:4. Panel D in Figure 3 shows a decreasing average productivity and a decreasing
vocational level as shown in case A above. Again, this result is counter-intuitive with respect to the 
dimension.
In Section 4, we have already described the link between Case A of the simulations and Proposition
1 using the plot of the 200,000 potential workers (Figure 4). Here we consider Case B. In Figure 5, we
observe the whole population inside the set of potential workers, together with the average values of 
and ; the regression line and the line of marginal workers dened by a wage rate equal to 3:5. The line of
marginal workers splits the set of active workers into the two subsets B1;w0=3:5 and B2;w0=3:5: As Figure
5 shows, Condition (4) is veried for w0 = 3:5; P (B1;w0=3:5) being clearly larger than (1 P (B1;w0=3:5)):
Moreover, observing workers who are out of the vocational market for w0 = 3:5, it is evident that, when
the wage rate increases, better workers will enter the market (workers with higher productivity and higher
motivation with respect to the average characteristics of those already active for w0 = 3:5). Finally, note
that Condition (3) is not veried for w0 = 3:5; P (A2;w0=3:5) being close to zero and so clearly lower than
(1  P (A2;w0=3:5)):
Cases C and B of the simulations can be interpreted following the very same reasoning.
Insert Figure 5 about here
A.6 Dependences between productivity and vocation in real data
In Subsection 4.1, we showed that a positive dependence between productivity and motivation given the
wage is a necessary condition for counter-intuitive results to occur.
To see whether this condition is statistically relevant, we use data from the Survey ICSI 2007 (Indagine
Cooperative Sociali Italiane, or the Survey on Italian Social Cooperatives). As we already mentioned in
the main text, we do not interpret the association between motivation and productivity as casual, but
simply as documenting their statistical connection.
Note that, by analyzing workers already in the vocation-based sector (employees in the cooperatives),
we are just verifying the sign of the conditional covariance dened by the wage rate observed in the sector
when the survey was performed, namely cov(;  j w0):
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The survey consists of 4,134 interviews with employees and 388 interviews with managers, from
441 Italian cooperatives in the non-prot sector. It is worth noting that the non-prot sector can be
reasonably considered as a vocation-based one. The survey comprises a large set of questions, ranging
from socio-demographic controls (i.e. age, gender, education, etc.) to economic variables (i.e. wage),
job characteristics (i.e. tasks, working hours, overtime) and job satisfaction with respect to a number of
possible domains (with colleagues, wage, type of job).
In particular, the ICSI survey includes the question How do you dene your relationship with the
cooperative?, the answer to which can be considered as a proxy for workersmotivation. In fact, workers
were asked to give their degree of consensus (on a 1 to 7 scale) to the following possible answers to the
previous question:
1. a mere contractual relationship where a job is exchanged for pay.
2. a contribution which helps the cooperative to reach its goal.
3. a mix between professional growth and personal development.
4. a set of relationships which goes beyond a mere contractual relationship.
5. a social commitment shared by the respondent and the cooperative.
The previous statements are indicated in our empirical analysis, respectively, as Vocation_1, Voca-
tion_2, Vocation_3, Vocation_4, Vocation_5, which are qualitative variables.
As a proxy for the productivity, we consider bonuses and cash prizes that workers received as an
extra earning with respect to their monthly wage. Furthermore, the monetary value of monthly benets
possibly received by employees (for instance free phone calls) is added to bonuses and cash prizes. Of
course, while all workers provided an answer to the questions concerning intrinsic motivation, only a
fraction of them declared that they received monthly bonuses and cash prizes or monthly benets, or
both. In particular, the percentage of workers that received benets or bonuses is about 28% of the total
workers. For this reason, in order to measure the relationship between motivation and productivity we
consider a Tobit model, in which monthly bonuses and cash prizes with benets (bonus_benefit) is
the dependent variable. We consider the following specications
bonus_benefit =
8<: 
0X +  if bonus_benefit > 0
0 otherwise:
;
in which  is a Gaussian error term with zero mean, X is the vector of regressors, and the linear part of
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the model is dened as
0X = 0 + 1sex+ 2italian+ 3permanent+ 4status+ 5type+
6age+ 7no_school + 8primary_school + 9 sec ondary_school +
10professional_school + 11other_school + 12high_school +
13univ_degree+ 14south+ 15north=west+ 16north=east+
17tenure+ 18full_time+ 19worked_hours+ ivocation_i:
In particular, we evaluate 5 di¤erent models, corresponding to the ve vocation statements, i.e.
vocation_1,. . . ,vocation_5.
We also consider a number of dummy variables as control variates. In particular, permanent means
that the worker has a permanent position, status species whether the worker is also a member of the
cooperative or not, type refers to the type of the cooperative25 , south; north=west, north=east and center
refer to the geographical location of the cooperative26 , tenure indicates the years spent in the cooperative
by the worker, full_time indicates full time job, and nally worked_hours states the hours worked per
month in the cooperative. We also considered the nationality (italian) and the schooling level (no_school,
primary_school, secondary_school, professional_school, high_school ,univ_degree, univ_laurea
and other_school)27 .
Our empirical ndings are illustrated in Table 1. In the specication, we nd that all the vocational
coe¢ cients except the rst one (which, as expected, is negative) have a positive and signicant impact
on productivity; in particular, consensus to Vocation_1 and Vocation_2 are signicant at the 1% level,
while consensus to Vocation_3, Vocation_4, and Vocation_5 are signicant at 5%. These ndings
provide evidence of a positive dependence between vocation and productivity for a given level of wage,
at least when productivity is measured by monthly bonuses and cash prizes with benets.28
Our empirical analysis suggests that the hypothesis of positive conditional correlation between voca-
25Two types of cooperatives are considered: cooperatives Amanage health and education services, cooperatives B
have the goal of inclusion of disadvantaged workers (disabled, ex-prisoners, ex-drug addicts...) in industry, agriculture and
trade.
26Note that center has been omitted to avoid collinearity.
27 In particular we indicate by univ_degree a 3 year university degree, whereas by univ_laurea we refer to a 4/5 year
degree.
28A possible objection to the previous empirical strategy is that there could be a rm-specic e¤ect in the cooperative
sector, meaning that the majority of the cooperatives give almost all their workers some bonuses and/or benets. However,
as shown in Figure 6, the proportion of cooperatives providing bonuses and/or benets to a given percentage of workers is
substantially uniform over the sample. From the gure, it is clear that only a few cooperatives provide extra wages to all
the workers, while many cooperatives provide extras only to a low fraction of people.
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tion and productivity is reasonable.
Insert Table 1 here
Insert Figure 6 here
An interesting caveat of the empirical analysis is that we cannot use the workerswage rate as a
proxy for productivity, even if workersmonthly wage is available in the data (some small di¤erences in
the workerswage rate exist, suggesting that the wage rate is not exactly uniform in this vocation-based
sector). In fact, by considering the wage rate as a proxy for productivity we implicitly assume that
the wage rate is always increasing in productivity, which obviously implies that productivity is always
increasing in the wage. However, results from the theoretical model show that average productivity
of active workers can be decreasing in the wage rate. Thus, if we used the wage rate as a proxy for
productivity as in the standard empirical literature on labor, the empirical analysis would not be coherent
with our theoretical results.29
29Such an empirical strategy is precisely used in Becchetti et al. (2009) who use the same ICSI 2007 survey and nd clear
evidence of positive correlation between intrinsic motivation and wage. In particular, in their empirical specication based
on the "monthly wage" as dependent variable, the authors found that consensus to the last four vocational statements has
a positive and signicant e¤ect on wages.
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Figure 1: the set of potential workers and the curve defining marginal workers 
given salary w0. 
Figure 2. In the standard market, expected productivity given the wage is monotonically 
increasing with the wage rate. In the vocational market, instead, counterintuitive effects 
can occur. In the figure, a case with average productivity monotonically decreasing and 
a case with average productivity monotonically increasing with the wage rate are shown. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Simulations. Case C shows intuitive effects. Cases A, B and D depict counterintuitive effects. Cases A and D present the counterintuitive (and monotonic) effects as 
for average productivity of active workers, Case B as for average vocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Explanation of case A of the simulations. 
Figure 5: Explanation of case B of the simulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Histogram of  frequencies for cooperatives that provide bonus/benefits to their 
workers. In particular, in the x-axis we report the percentage of workers for each 
cooperative receiving bonuses and/or benefits in the sample (Survey ICSI 2007).  
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